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Abstract: In their persistent fight to aﬀect regulation, firms have developed specific strate-
gies to exploit scientific uncertainty. They have spent large amounts of money to gener-
ate and publicize favorable scientific findings, to discredit and downplay unfavorable ones
and to shape the public’s perceptions through large-scale communication campaigns. We
develop a new model to study the interplay between scientific uncertainty, firms’ commu-
nication and public policies. The government is benevolent but populist and maximizes
social welfare as perceived by citizens. The industry can provide costly evidence that its
activity is not harmful. Citizens incorrectly treat the industry’s information on par with
scientific knowledge. We characterize the industry’s optimal communication policy. As sci-
entists become increasingly convinced that the industrial activity is harmful, firms first
devote more and more resources to reassure people. When scientists’ beliefs reach a critical
threshold, however, the industry stops its eﬀorts abruptly. We then study the impact of
firms’ communication on scientific funding. A populist government may, perversely, want
to support research to better allow firms to miscommunicate. Populist policies can entail
significant welfare losses. Establishing an independent funding agency always reduces these
losses and may lead to under- or over- investment in research with respect to the first-best.
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I Introduction
In their persistent fight to aﬀect regulation, firms have developed specific strategies to
exploit scientific uncertainty. For instance, tobacco producers have consistently denied ad-
verse eﬀects of active smoking in the 1950s and 1960s and of second-hand smoke exposure
during the 1970s through the 1990s, see Bero (2013). They have spent large amounts of
money to generate and publicize favorable scientific findings, to discredit and downplay
unfavorable ones and to shape the public’s perceptions through large-scale communica-
tion campaigns, see Proctor (2011).1 On climate change, special interest groups have long
exploited scientific uncertainties to promote inaction, see Hoggan & Littlemore (2009).
Communication strategies outlined in a leaked 1998 memo of the American Petroleum
Institute are remarkably similar to those documented for tobacco.2 This deliberate man-
ufacturing of doubt appears to be a main reason behind the many documented cases of
unheeded early warnings, see European Environment Agency (2013).3 It has likely had a
first-order detrimental impact on welfare in our innovations-filled societies. While firms’
practices are being increasingly scrutinized by social scientists,4 their economic analysis is
still undeveloped. Our study aims to fill this gap.
In this paper, we develop a new model to study the interplay between scientific un-
certainty, firms’ communication and public policies. We consider a government which is
benevolent but populist: It maximizes social welfare as perceived by citizens. The industry
tries to aﬀect public opinion to obtain a more lenient regulation. It can, at a cost, pro-
vide evidence that its activity is not harmful. We assume that citizens incorrectly treat
the industry’s information on par with scientific knowledge. We develop our analysis in
1For instance, a 1978 report prepared for the Tobacco Institute states that “The strategic and long-run
antidote to the passive smoking issue is, as we see it, developing and widely publicizing clear-cut, credible
medical evidence that passive smoking is not harmful to the non-smoker’s health.” see p.154 in Bero (2013).
2See Cushman (1998) and Walker (1998). Objectives included “Identifying and establishing cooperative
relationships with all major scientists whose research in this field supports our position” and “Providing
grants for advocacy on climate science, as deemed appropriate.”. Oreskes & Conway (2010) document how,
as announced in this memo, a handful of scientists were coopted by industrial lobbies to advance their
agenda and played an active role in science-denying communication campaigns.
3Cases with long delays in regulatory and legislative actions despite solid early evidence include lead
in petrol, Beryllium exposure, asbestos, Bisphenol A, and neonicotinoid insecticides.
4See, e.g., Proctor & Schiebinger (2008). Robert Proctor introduced the term “agnotology” to denote
the study of the determinants of ignorance.
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two stages. We first consider a given level of scientific uncertainty. We analyze the lobby’s
optimal communication policy and its impact on citizens’ beliefs, regulation and welfare.
In a second stage, we endogenize the level of research. We study how firms’ communication
aﬀects scientific funding under diﬀerent types of institutions.
Our analysis yields novel insights. We show, first, that the industry’s communication
eﬀort is a non-monotonous and discontinuous function of scientific belief. As scientists be-
come increasingly convinced that the activity is harmful, the industry first devotes more
and more resources to reassure people. This yields increasingly large welfare losses, rep-
resenting the costs of denial. When scientists’ beliefs reach a critical threshold, however,
overcoming the scientific consensus becomes too costly and the industry stops its eﬀort
abruptly. This result can help explain some documented tendencies. It is consistent with
the large lags typically observed between the times where scientists reach a consensus on
the necessity of regulation and where an eﬀective public policy is implemented.5 It predicts
sudden reversals in the oﬃcial positions of special interest groups as was observed in the
past on tobacco and as recently seen on climate change. It also predicts large swings in
public opinion and episodes of abrupt awakening to the dangers posed by some activity,
triggered by potentially unremarkable events or information.6
We then show that the wedge driven by the industry between scientists’ and citizens’
beliefs has key implications for scientific funding. We analyze the incentives of diﬀerent
types of institutions to support research. We uncover some rich eﬀects. Since a populist
government cares about perceived welfare, its utility increases when citizens are unduly
reassured. This may lead to a partial alignment of interests between the government and
the industry. In some cases, a populist government does not wish to support research.
In other cases, a populist government supports research because this support allows the
industry to better influence public opinion. We show that a partial answer to this problem
is to establish an independent funding agency, not unlike the current National Science
5See European Environment Agency (2013), which notably shows that situations of ‘false positives’,
when preventive actions undertaken due to early scientific warnings turn out to be unnecessary, are much
less frequent than those of ‘false negatives’, where no action is undertaken despite early warnings that are
confirmed ex-post.
6Our analysis can help explain people’s persistent underestimation of the scientific consensus on climate
change (Ding et al. (2011)) and recent episodes of declining concern (Brulle, Carmichael & Jenkins (2012)).
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Foundation and European Research Council. Interestingly, the independent agency may
decide to provide more or less scientific support than under the first-best. Either strategy
may provide the best way to limit the damaging eﬀects of firms’ communication.
Our analysis relies on the assumption that citizens fail to account for the biases behind
the provision of information by the industry.7 This failure could have two causes. On one
hand, citizens could be fully rational but unaware of the industry’s involvement in research.
Thus, the analysis of the tobacco documents shows that the industry tried hard to hide
its involvement in biased research, see p.157-158 in Bero (2013). More generally, industry-
funded scientists have shown a tendency to conceal their funding sources, a tendency
exposed by many scandals in the medical sector and which has prompted the adoption
of disclosure rules.8 On the other hand, citizens may fail to account for the origin of the
information they receive when forming their beliefs. A similar form of limited rationality
underlies, for instance, the well-documented persuasion bias studied in DeMarzo, Vayanos
& Zwiebel (2003). This failure could arise from the incorrect belief that reports in the news
media form an accurate picture of the reality. Journalists generally strive to fairly represent
all sides of controversial issues, see Shapiro (2015). However, when one side is composed
of objective scientists and the other side represents special interests, a “balanced” report
is necessarily biased.
Our analysis contributes to four literatures. First, a few studies have started to ana-
lyze the incentives of special interest groups to aﬀect public opinion.9 10 In an early study,
Yu (2005) looks at the interaction between direct and indirect competition for political
influence. In his setup, an industrial and an environmental lobby both try to aﬀect regula-
tion in two ways: through political lobbying and through communication campaigns. Yu
7Similarly, Shapiro (2015) assumes that a voter cannot distinguish between reported claims and reported
facts.
8See Thacker (2014) for an illuminating discussion of the issue. Corporate-funded ghostwriting is sus-
pected to be a major problem in biomedical research, see PLoS Medecine Editors (2009). In addition,
current journal policies may not be very eﬀective at revealing financial ties, see Bero, Glantz & Hong
(2005).
9A large literature studies political lobbying, where special interest groups try to influence policymakers
through the provision of either money or information, see e.g. Grossman & Helpman (1994, 2001), Austen-
Smith & Wright (1992), Cotton & Dellis (2015).
10In Laussel & van Ypersele (2012), the actions of lobby groups or unions may provide informative
signals to voters about the quality of the government.
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(2005) does not model scientific progress, however. By contrast, scientific uncertainty is
central to our analysis.11 In a recent analysis, Shapiro (2015) models competition between
special interests to seek political influence through the news media. He notably shows
how the journalistic norm of balanced reporting may arise due to reputational concerns
and how, in turn, this norm may be exploited by special interests and may ultimately
yield less informative reports. His study and ours develop complementary perspectives. He
pays special attention to journalists’ incentives and adopts a basic view of science where
evidence is either uninformative or fully informative. By contrast, we take the process of
opinion formation as given and consider a rich representation of science, where evidence
can accumulate and bring scientists progressively closer to the truth. This allows us to
analyze how firms’ communication eﬀorts depend on the level of scientific uncertainty and
how, in turn, this miscommunication aﬀects scientific funding
Second, our paper contributes to a literature studying the implications of the fact
that citizens often hold incorrect beliefs. In particular, researchers have long debated the
normative consequences of citizens’ misperceptions. In short, should a benevolent govern-
ment assuage fears or save lives?12 Salanié & Treich (2009) analyze optimal regulations
for the two types of governments, and we adopt some of their terminology. In this litera-
ture, however, citizens’ and experts’ perceptions are typically taken as given. By contrast,
these perceptions are formed endogenously in our framework, and are aﬀected by scientific
progress and by industry’s communication. This raises new questions such as how the
extent of misperception depends on the economy’s fundamentals and the determination of
scientific policies.
Third, a large and growing literature explores the eﬀect of uncertainty on environmental
outcomes. Most studies in this literature consider a benevolent social planner with no mis-
perception.13 Recently, researchers have started to study uncertainty in strategic contexts,
such as free-riding between countries.14 Here, we focus on a new channel through which
11Introducing political lobbying and other interest groups in our setup provide natural directions for
future research, see the Conclusion.
12See, e.g., Portney (1992), Pollak (1998) and Viscusi & Hamilton (1999).
13See, e.g., Gollier, Jullien & Treich (2000), Heal & Kriström (2002), Weitzman (2009) and studies based
on integrated assessment models as in Nordhaus (1994) and Stern (2007).
14As in Baker (2005), Bramoullé & Treich (2009), Finus & Pintassilgo (2013) and Ulph (2004).
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uncertainty may aﬀect the environment: citizens’ misperceptions induced by firms’ com-
munication in the presence of scientific uncertainty. We provide one of the first systematic
analysis of this channel and show that it may have a first-order impact on environmental
and scientific outcomes.
Finally, our paper contributes to the economic analysis of science. Most studies in this
field consider science independently of the political process.15 By contrast, we focus on the
interaction between scientists, firms and the government. We show how an industry can
exploit scientific uncertainty to advance its agenda and how these considerations may, in
turn, aﬀect scientific funding.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce our model in Section 2.
We develop models of scientific progress and of formation of popular beliefs and characterize
the industry’s optimal communication policy in Section 3. We endogenize the level of
research in Section 4 and conclude in Section 5.
II Model
We consider a society composed of four groups of agents: firms, scientists, citizens and
the government. Firms’ economic activity generates pollution, which may be harmful to
people’s health and to the environment. The government has to decide about the level of
regulation of this pollution. Scientists are uncertain about the impacts of pollution and the
extent of harm it might cause. They may do research to reduce this uncertainty. Both firms
and scientists communicate about the eﬀects of the economic activity. Citizens then form
beliefs about these eﬀects, and the government takes public opinion into account when
adopting the regulation.
Formally, firms’ benefits from emitting emissions  are equal to () = 0 − 122
with  0  0. In the absence of regulation, benefits are maximized by emitting  = 0,
the business as usual level of pollution. The government regulates by imposing a maximal
level of emissions  ≤ 0.16 The environmental regulation costs (0)−() to firms, and
15See, e.g., Aghion, Dewatripoint & Stein (2008), Bramoullé & Saint-Paul (2010) and Brock & Durlauf
(1999).
16The target level of emissions can be equivalently reached through fixed or transferrable quotas or
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this cost is increasing and convex in the level of abatement 0 − . Thus, firms have an
incentive to be as little regulated as possible.
Emissions may generate damages. For simplicity, we assume that scientific uncertainty
takes a binary form. Either pollution is indeed harmful, and overall damages are equal to
() = 0 + 122 with 0  ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ 0. Or pollution is not harmful. Scientists
believe that pollution is harmful with probability . The expected social welfare is thus
equal to:
 ( ) = ()− ()
Say that a government is technocratic when it maximizes social welfare computed with
up-to-date scientific knowledge. A technocratic government sets the emissions level to
optimally balance social benefits and social costs. This means that 0() = 0(), which
yields:
() = 0 − 0+   (1)
This corresponds to the first-best outcome in our context. Note that  is decreasing and
convex in scientific belief .17
Citizens’ beliefs may diﬀer from scientists’ beliefs, however. Firms are organized in a
communication lobby, which tries to aﬀect public opinion on the eﬀects of pollution.18 Cit-
izens’ belief, , then depends both on scientific beliefs and on the industry’s communication
eﬀort. Say that a government is populist when it maximizes social welfare as perceived by
citizens:  ( ) = ()− (). The level of regulation chosen by a populist government
is then equal to (). When citizens are less worried about the impacts of pollution than
scientists,    and ()  (). A populist government then underregulates with respect
to the first-best. This provides incentives for the industry to try and reassure citizens on
the eﬀects of their activity.
through a Pigovian tax on emissions.
17Indeed, we have 0() = −(0+0)(+)2  0 and 00() = 2(0+0)(+)3 ≥ 0.
18For instance, US tobacco companies formed in 1954 the Tobacco Industry Research Committee, which
later became the Council for Tobacco Research. “The industry stated publicly that it was forming the
TIRC to fund independent scientific research to determine whether there was a link between smoking and
lung cancer. However, internal documents from Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company have shown that
the TIRC was actually formed for public relations purposes, to convince the public that the hazards of
smoking had not been proven.”, see Bero (2013, p.156).
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We assume that the government is populist in Section 3. We consider an exogenous
level of research and study the industry’s optimal communication policy. In Section 4, we
endogenize the level of research under various institutional arrangements.
III Exogenous Science
In this section, we consider an exogenous level of research. We first develop a simple
Bayesian model of scientific progress. We then build on it to model industry communication
and opinion formation. Finally, we characterize the industry’s optimal communication
policy and its resulting outcomes.
A Scientific and popular beliefs
Consider the following model of scientific progress. Scientists can do research to reduce
their uncertainty on the eﬀects of pollution. They have prior beliefs 0 that pollution is
harmful. They may run  experiments to learn about the truth. Each experiment provides
a noisy signal on the true state of the world, and is correct with probability 1
2
   1.
Denote by  the number of experiments indicating that pollution is harmful. Applying
Bayes’ rule, we see that scientists’ ex-post belief is equal to
 = 0
 (1−  )−
0 (1−  )− + (1− 0) −(1−  ) 
Let  = (1−  )  1 denote the relative precision of an experiment. This yields:
(0  ) = 0

0 + (1− 0)−  (2)
Note that  ≥ 0 ⇔  ≥ 2. More generally, this formula embodies key features of
Bayesian updating. For instance, if experiments are run in several stages the final belief
does not depend on their ordering. Formally, ((0 1 1) 2 2) = (0 1+2 1+2)
for any 1 ≤ 1 and 2 ≤ 2.
Thus, scientists’ belief is a discrete stochastic variable ˜, such that ˜ = (0  ) with
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probability 0 (1−  )− + (1− 0)−(1−  ) for any integer  between 0 and
. We can check that the expectation of scientists’ beliefs is equal to the prior: for any
, ˜ = 0. As  increases, ˜ puts more and more weight on beliefs further and further
away from 0. As  → ∞, we show in Appendix that ˜ converges in probability towards
the distribution ∞ = 0 with probability 1− 0 and 1 with probability 0. As the number
of experiments becomes arbitrarily large, scientific knowledge converges to the truth.
Citizens’ beliefs may diﬀer from scientists’ beliefs, however. At cost , the industry
can produce one unit of evidence documenting that pollution is not harmful. Our key
assumption is that citizens fail to account for the biases underlying the information provided
by the industry. The industry’s information is incorrectly treated as independent scientific
evidence. Under this assumption, citizens’ belief is equal to
 = 0

0 + (1− 0)−+
where  denotes the industry’s communication eﬀort. In fact,  can be expressed as a
function of scientists’ beliefs  and of communication eﬀort :
() = + (1− )  (3)
As discussed in the Introduction, the industry’s eﬀorts in reality may take various
shapes and may aﬀect citizens’ perceptions through diﬀerent channels. In particular, the
industry may develop its own research program, only publicizing favorable results; it may
hire and fund dissenting scientists; or it may launch classical advertising campaigns.19
We now clarify how citizens’ belief varies with  and . We compute ’s various
derivatives in Appendix. We see, first, that   0 and   0. The marginal impact of
scientists’ belief on citizens’ belief is positive and decreasing. Then, observe that   0:
 is decreasing in  from ( 0) =  to (∞) = 0. Interestingly, its curvature may vary:
  0 if   12 and   0 if   12 . Two cases emerge. Suppose first that  ≤ 12 .
19Proctor (2011) and Bero (2013) show how tobacco companies adopted variants of these three strategies
throughout the years. They also form a central part of the industry’s plan of action on climate change,
see Cushman (1998), Walker (1998), Hoggan & Littlemore (2009).
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Then,  is convex in. In that case, the marginal impact of the lobby’s communication on
citizens’ belief is decreasing in absolute value. By contrast if  ≥ 1
2
,  is first concave in 
until  = 1
2
, which happens for = ln((1−)) ln(), above which  is convex. Therefore,
when scientists think that pollution is likely to be harmful, communication eﬀorts first have
an increasing marginal impact, in absolute value, on citizens’ beliefs. In other words, there
may be increasing returns, at first, in the impact of industry communication on citizens’
beliefs.20 We will see below that this feature plays an important role in determining the
optimal communication policy.
B Firms’ optimal communication
We now derive our first main result. We characterize the industry’s optimal communication
policy. We uncover the existence of three domains. When  is low and scientists believe
that pollution is unlikely to be harmful, the benefits from communication are too low and
the industry does not try to change citizens’ beliefs. When  takes intermediate values,
and scientists are more uncertain about the eﬀects of the pollution, the industry engages
in communication and targets a specific level of citizens’ belief. As  increases, the target is
unchanged and communication eﬀorts first increase continuously. When  reaches a critical
threshold, however, the costs of communication become too high and the industry abruptly
stops its communication eﬀorts. Optimal communication is therefore non-monotonous and
discontinuous in scientists’ beliefs.
Formally, the industry’s objective is to maximize its payoﬀ () = ((()))−
with respect to . We provide an in-depth study of the variations of this function in the
Appendix. Introduce the cost value ¯ such that:
¯ = 4
27
ln()(0 + 0)
2
(+ )2
and let ∗ be a solution to the problem of maximizing  over [0+∞[
20This property is related to a general feature of Bayesian updating. When an agent receives information
running counter to his current belief, each additional piece of information has, at first, a larger marginal
impact on belief revision.
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Theorem 1 If  ≥ ¯, then ∗ = 0. If   ¯, then there is a target popular belief ∗ 
2(3+ ) and a threshold scientific belief ∗  2(3+ ) such that: (1) If  ≤ ∗, then
∗ = 0; (2) If ∗ ≤   ∗, then (∗ ) = ∗ and
∗ = 1
ln()
∙
ln(

1− )− ln(
∗
1− ∗ )
¸

(3) If   ∗, then ∗ = 0. If  ≥ ¯, then ∗ = 0.
We provide a sketch of the proof here, see the Appendix for details and for character-
izations of ∗ and ∗. We start by examining the second derivative of the payoﬀ function.
We see two cases emerging. On the one hand if   2(3+ ),  is everywhere concave.
Since ()  0 if  is large enough, the solution is then obtained by analyzing the sign
of 0(0). We show that 0(0)  0 if   ∗, which implies that ∗ = 0 in that case. In
contrast, 0(0)  0 if   ∗ and ∗ then solves 0() = 0. We can express 0() as a
function of , and this equation then defines the target belief ∗. On the other hand if
  2(3+ ),  is first convex and then concave. When  is high, the industry’s payoﬀ
first displays increasing returns in communication eﬀorts. We show that in this case, the
solution is either to reach the target ∗ or to set∗ = 0.21 We compare the payoﬀs obtained
from these two actions and show that there exists a critical threshold ∗ above which ∗
brings less payoﬀ than no communication. This discontinuity in the solution is induced by
the presence of convexities in payoﬀs.
21At  = ∗, the industry is indiﬀerent between playing ∗ = 0 or reaching ∗. The problem of
maximizing  has two solutions.
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Figure 1: Firms’ communication and citizens’ beliefs.
We illustrate Theorem 1 in Figure 1. Parameters’ values are set as follows: 0 = 10,
 = 1, 0 = 10,  = 2,  = 5, and  = 0647. From these values and our characterizations
in Appendix, we compute the critical values ∗ and ∗ and obtain ∗ = 03 and ∗ = 097.
Here, the costs of communication to the industry are quite low compared to the benefits
and eﬀort is positive over a relatively large range of scientific beliefs. We depict in Figure
1 how ∗, in the Left panel, and (∗ ), in the Right panel, vary with . Note that
citizens’ belief also varies discontinuously with . It stays at the target level ∗ as long as
the industry is engaged in communication and then jumps back to  when the industry
stops its eﬀorts.
The combination of citizens’ misperceptions induced by the industry and populist poli-
cies can lead to significant welfare losses. Note that  ( ()) −  ( ()) = −1
2
( +
)[()− ()]2  0. This loss represents the cost of denial and increases in absolute value
as  decreases and gets further away from . We depict the ratio of the level of welfare
under the populist policy over the level of welfare in the first-best ,  ( ()) ( ()),
in Figure 2 for the same parameter values as in Figure 1. We see that relative welfare
loss first increases as scientific belief, and hence firms’ communication and the induced
distortion in citizens’ belief, increase. For high values of , this distortion is so high that
expected damages become greater than benefits and welfare under populist policies be-
comes negative.
11
Figure 2: Welfare loss induced by firms’ communication.
From our characterization, we can further derive some potentially interesting compara-
tive statics. Consider, for instance, the impact of the precision of scientific experiments. An
increase in  has two countervailing eﬀects. On one hand, scientists converge more quickly
towards the truth when  is higher. The distribution of scientific beliefs tends to be more
dispersed and, in the absence of industry communication, this applies to citizens’ beliefs as
well. On the other hand, we see that ¯ is increasing in  and we show in the Appendix that
∗ is decreasing while ∗ is increasing in . Because citizens do not diﬀerentiate between
information provided by the industry and by scientists, a higher  makes the industry’s
communication more eﬀective.22 Industry communication thus emerges for higher values of
communication costs and over a larger range of scientific beliefs. This runs counter to the
first eﬀect and tends to slow down the convergence of citizens’ beliefs towards the truth.
IV Endogenous Science
In this section, we endogenize the level of research. We study and compare the levels of
research chosen in three diﬀerent setups: when the government is technocratic; when the
22Relatedly, the amount of communication needed to reach a fixed target of popular belief is lower when
 is higher.
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government is populist and decides on both the environmental regulation and scientific
funding; and when the government is populist but scientific funding is decided by an
independent agency. Throughout the section, we analyze a game with the following timing.
In a first step, the institution setting the scientific policy decides how many experiments to
finance. These experiments are then run and scientists form their beliefs. In a second step,
the industry chooses a level of communication eﬀort. Citizens then form their beliefs. In a
third step, the government regulates the industry’s activity. Finally, benefits and costs are
realized.
A Welfare
We first determine the welfare ranking of these three institutional arrangements. Recall,
 ( ) = ()− () denotes the interim welfare, computed once research is done but
before the state of the world is revealed. We now consider social welfare computed ex-
ante, before the results from research are known. If there are  scientific experiments, the
expected interim welfare is equal to [ (˜ (˜))|] for a technocratic government and
to [ (˜ (˜))|] when the environmental regulation is set by a populist government.
Assume that each experiment costs . A technocratic government chooses the level of
scientific funding by maximizing
() = [ (˜ (˜))|]− 
By contrast, a populist government maximizes
Π() = [ (˜ (˜))|]− 
where the first part represents the expected perceived welfare. Finally, consider an indepen-
dent research agency deciding on the level of scientific funding before a populist government
regulates pollution. Assume that this agency is benevolent and computes welfare based on
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up-to-date scientific knowledge rather than on public opinion. It seeks to maximize
() = [ (˜ (˜))|]− 
Denote by  ∗ the ex-ante social welfare computed at the level of research chosen by
institution . We show next that welfare can be ranked unambiguously across the three
institutions.
Proposition 1  ∗ ≤ ∗ ≤ ∗
To see why Proposition 1 holds, note first that  ∗ corresponds to the first-best -
and hence highest - level of welfare attainable in the economy. Therefore,  ∗,  ∗ ≤
 ∗. Then, observe that the independent agency maximizes welfare under a populist
environmental regulation. Therefore,  ∗ is the highest level of welfare attainable when
 = (), which implies that  ∗ ≥ ∗. (We provide a formal proof in the Appendix).
This result shows that the counterintuitive eﬀects often present in second-best settings
do not appear here.23 Even when scientific funding is endogenous, populist policies entail
welfare losses. And these losses are always oﬀset when scientific funding is decided by a
technocratic agency which is independent from the government.
23See Lipsey & Lancaster (1956).
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Figure 3: Welfare of populist and agency policies relative to the first-best.
We illustrate Proposition 1 in Figure 3, for the same parameter values as in Figure 1.
Figure 3 depicts how  ∗ ∗ and  ∗ ∗ vary as function of initial belief 0. As
predicted by our result, we see that these ratios are always lower than or equal to 1 and
that the welfare loss under an independent agency is always lower than under a populist
government. These losses are also strongly aﬀected by the initial belief. In our example,
 ∗ ∗ is decreasing and concave in 0. Recall, here firms aﬀect public opinion over
a relatively large range of scientific beliefs [∗ ∗] = [03 097]. When 0 increases, firms
eﬀectively communicate more often and this reduces welfare under a populist government.
An independent agency is able to limit the worst impacts of firms’ communication. While
 ∗ ∗ is also decreasing and concave in 0, it decreases at a much slower rate. For
instance when 0 = 09,  ∗ ∗ ≈ 010 while  ∗ ∗ ≈ 053.
B Scientific policies
We now study the scientific policies adopted under the diﬀerent institutions. Consider a
technocratic government first. Observe that  ( ()) = (())− (()) is convex in
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.24 Therefore, the government wants to obtain a scientific belief which is as dispersed as
possible. For instance when is linear, we have: [ (˜ (˜))|] = (0 (0))+ 12 
2
0  (˜)
where  (˜) is the belief’s variance. In general, [ (˜ (˜))|] is maximum when scientists
have converged to the truth and ˜ = ∞. As  increases, expected interim welfare tends
to increase at decreasing rate. However, this tendency is not absolute. Due, in part, to
the discrete nature of Bayesian updating in our setup, expected welfare can be locally
decreasing or convex in , giving rise to rich features in the behavior of the first-best
scientific policy.25 To sum up, a technocratic government trades-oﬀ the welfare benefits
from uncertainty reduction against the research costs.
Next, consider a populist government. A key new motive appears in the govern-
ment’s objective. Since  ( ()) increases when  decreases, the utility of a populist
government is higher when citizens are reassured and  is lower, even when this reassur-
ance is scientifically unfounded. This means that the interests of a populist government
may be partly aligned with those of the industry. For instance, we show in Appendix
that when 0 ¿ 0 and  ¿ ,  ( ()) is approximately linear in . In that case,
[ (˜ (˜))|] ≈ (˜ (˜)) and, if  is low, a populist government simply wishes to
minimize the expected popular belief.26
How does ˜ vary with ? Broadly speaking, ˜ is lower when ˜ puts more weight on
values from which the industry can better miscommunicate. When  is large, ˜ is close
to ∞ and puts little weight on beliefs lying between [∗ ∗]. Indeed, ˜ converges to ∞
and ˜ converges to 0 as  tends to ∞. Variations of ˜ are then partly determined by
the position of initial scientific belief 0 with respect to the domain of eﬀective industry
communication [∗ ∗]. If 0 ∈ [∗ ∗], the industry aﬀects public opinion even when there
is very little research. In that case, ˜ is often increasing in  and a populist government
24By the envelope theorem, the first derivative is equal to −(()). The second derivative is then equal
to −0()0(()) ≥ 0.
25For instance, numerical simulations indicate that [ (˜ (˜))|] may be initially convex in  when 0
is close to 0 or 1 and  is not too large. Optimal funding then jumps discontinuously from 0 to a positive,
and potentially high, level as the cost of scientific experiments  decreases.
26In general, since ( ()) is decreasing and convex in , the utility of a populist government is higher
when both the expectation of popular belief is lower and its dispersion is higher. For instance, when  is
linear,  ( ()) = ( ()) + 12 
2
0  ().
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would want to give no support to scientific activities. In contrast, if 0  ∗ or 0  ∗,
˜ = 0 when  = 0. In that case, ˜ is often non-monotonic in  and reaches a minimum
for some positive value . This is the level of research that allows the industry to most
eﬀectively communicate, in expectation.
We illustrate these eﬀects in Figure 4. Parameters are such that ∗ = 04 and ∗ =
087.27 On the left panel, 0 = 08 ∈ [∗ ∗] and ˜ is increasing in .28 A populist
government minimizing expected popular belief does not provide any support to research.
On the right panel, 0 = 09  ∗ and ˜ is initially decreasing in , reaching a minimum
at  = 4. A populist government minimizing ˜ would then choose  = 4. To sum up,
a populist government may want to support science in order to better allow the industry
to unduly reassure citizens. As shown in Proposition 1, these populist policies are clearly
detrimental in terms of welfare.
Figure 4. Expected citizens’ belief and the level of research.
In contrast to the populist government, an independent research agency tries to lessen
the ability of the industry to aﬀect citizens’ beliefs. Depending on the parameters’ values,
this may lead the independent agency to provide more or less scientific funding than under
the first-best. We illustrate these eﬀects in Figure 5. We depict how the optimal scientific
27We adopt the same parameter values as for Figure 1, except for  = 0611. Note that since  is lower,
 is lower and we see that this yields an increase in ∗ and a decrease in ∗ as predicted in our comparative
statics analysis.
28We consider even values of  in simulations and Figures.
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policies under the three institutions vary with initial belief 0, for the same parameters as
in Figure 1. The left bars in dark grey correspond to the first-best levels of funding, in the
absence of citizens’ misperceptions. Support for research first increases and then decreases
as 0 increases. A technocratic government only cares about the direct benefits and costs of
reducing scientific uncertainty. Funding reaches a maximum when uncertainty is maximal
(0 = 05) while research is not funded when uncertainty is low (0 = 01 or 0 ≥ 08).
The middle bars in white depict the scientific policies chosen by a populist government.
When scientists have initial suspicions that harm is likely (05 ≤ 0 ≤ 07), the government
provides less funding for research than under the first-best. Too much research would
decrease perceived welfare by reducing the ability of firms to reassure citizens. By contrast
when initial belief is low (0 ≤ 03), the populist government over-provides support for
research. In the unlikely case where the activity is harmful, the government wants citizens
to be reassured. Providing more research increases the opportunities for, and impacts of,
firms’ communication.
Finally, the right bars in light grey depict the scientific policies of an independent
funding agency. We see that the agency essentially has two opposite ways to try and limit
the welfare losses induced by populist policies. When initial beliefs are high (0 ≥ 06),
the agency provides much more funding than under the first-best. This is a strategy of
scientific overkill : By doing lots of research, scientists necessarily get close to the truth
and firms have very little leeway to influence public opinion.29 The benefits from shutting
down firms’ communication outweigh the added research costs when the likelihood that the
activity is harmful is high. By contrast, when initial beliefs are low (0 ≤ 05), the agency
provides almost no funding. This is a strategy of deliberate ignorance, since some research
would yield lower welfare than no research. Figure 2 shows that these strategies are quite
eﬀective at reducing the welfare losses from populist policies. Overall, we see that firms’
miscommunication has a first-order impact on scientific policies.
29That is, there is a low probability that scientists’ belief ˜ ends up in the range [∗ ∗] where firms
aﬀect public opinion.
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Figure 5: Scientific funding under three institutional arrangements.
V Conclusion
We provide one of the first analysis of the interactions between scientific uncertainty, firms’
communication and public policies. We characterize firms’ optimal communication and un-
cover the existence of three domains. When scientists’ belief that firms’ activity is harmful
is low, engaging in communication is not profitable. When scientists’ belief takes interme-
diate values, firms target a low level of citizens’ belief and exert as much eﬀort as needed
for public opinion to reach this level. Above a critical level of scientific belief, however,
firms give up on their attempts at reassuring citizens. We show that this form of indirect
lobbying has a first-order impact on scientific funding. We compare scientific policies un-
der three types of institutions and unearth rich eﬀects. Both a populist government and
an independent agency may provide more or less support to research than a technocratic
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government, although they do so for opposite reasons and in diﬀerent circumstances.
Our analysis relies on a number of simplifying assumptions. Relaxing them provide nat-
ural, and potentially, fruitful directions for future research. Since a populist government
maximizes perceived welfare, firms do not have an incentive to engage in political lobbying
here. Alternatively, the government could maximize a combination of welfare and transfers
as in Grossman & Helpman (1994). Firms would then try to aﬀect regulation both directly
through transfers and indirectly via public opinion, and studying the interaction between
direct and indirect lobbying could be interesting. We suspect that Theorem 1 would ex-
tend and that the sharp drop in communication eﬀorts would be associated with a sharp
increase in political lobbying.30 As in Yu (2005), it would also be natural to consider in-
teractions between an industrial and an environmental lobby. Competition to aﬀect public
opinion would likely raise firms’ communication eﬀorts and could also lead them to give
up on communication for lower levels of scientific beliefs.31 Finally, we have focused our
representation of science on the key question of understanding the level of harm induced
by the economic activity. In reality, science of course covers a wide variety of issues and
questions. A documented strategy of industrial lobbies has been to fund “distraction re-
search”, i.e., legitimate research that does not advance knowledge on this key question and
distracts scientists and citizens’ attention away from it.32 Developing a richer model of
science would allow to analyze these elaborate strategies.
30In particular, this could shed new light on the debate on the regulation of political contributions. The
introduction of a limit to contributions, for instance, could lead to an increase in miscommunication and,
possibly, to a decrease in welfare. We thank Arnaud Dellis for drawing our attention to this implication.
31We suspect that our results would be little aﬀected by the introduction of an environmental interest
group with much lower financial resources than the industrial lobby.
32See, in particular, chapter 16 in Proctor (2011).
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APPENDIX
Proofs of statements in Section 3.1.
We prove, first, that ˜ converges in probability to ∞ as  tends to ∞. Suppose
that  is even. Introduce  =  − 2 and  =  (1 −  ). We have: (0  ) =
0
0+(1−0)− = ˆ(0 ) with probability  +2 2. Fix . As  increases, we can see
that the probability put on ˆ(0 ) tends to zero. More precisely, elementary computations
show that +2 2[ +(+1)2+1 (+1)2] ≤   1 if  is high enough. Since ˆ(0 ) → 1
when  → +∞ and ˆ(0 ) → 0 when  → −∞, this means that ∀   0∃¯ :  ≥
¯⇒ ((0  ) ∈ [ 1− ]) ≤ . Thus, the probability that ˜ belongs to some interior
interval becomes arbitrarily small as  becomes large. Since (˜) = 0, ˜ must converge
in probability to ∞. The proof for  odd runs along similar lines. QED.
Next, compute the derivatives of ():
 = 

[+ (1− )]2
 = −2
(1− )
[+ (1− )]3
 = −(1− ) ln() 

[+ (1− )]2
 = −(1− )[ln()]2 − (1− )

[+ (1− )]3
QED.
Proof of Theorem 1.
We first derive some useful formulas. By taking the derivative of (1), we get:
0() = −(0 + 0)
2
(+ )2
Then, observe that

1−  =

1− 
−
Taking logs and deriving with respect to  yields
0 = − ln()(1− )
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Deriving again and substituting yields
00 = − ln2()(1− )(2 − 1)
We now compute the first derivative of  with respect to :
0() = (0 − ())0()0 − 
0() = ln()2(0 + 0)2 
2(1− )
(+ )3 − 
Deriving again and simplifying yields
00() = − ln2()2(0 + 0)2 
2(1− )
(+ )4 [2− (3+ )]
(1) Suppose first that   2
3+ . Since  ≤ , 00  0 and  is concave. Since 0(∞) = −,
either 0(0) ≤ 0 and the optimal eﬀort is 0 or 0(0)  0 and the optimal eﬀort is the unique
∗  0 satisfying 0() = 0. We have:
0(0) = ln()2(0 + 0)2
2(1− )
(+ )3 − 
To understand how 0(0) varies with , study the function () = 2(1−)
(+)3 . We have:
 0() = [2− (3+ )]
(+ )4
This implies that  0  0 if  ∈]0 2
3+ [ and  0 if  ∈] 23+  1[. Therefore, (0) = (1) = 0
and  is increasing over [0 2
3+ ], decreasing over [
2
3+  1] and reaches its maximum at 23+ .
Moreover, ( 2
3+) =
4
27
1
(+)2 . Two subcases appear:
(1.1) If  ≥ 4
27
ln() (0+0)2
(+)2 , then 0(0) ≤ 0 and  = 0.
(1.2) If   4
27
ln() (0+0)2
(+)2 , then there is a unique ∗ ∈ [0 23+ ] such that 0() = 0. It
satisfies:
2(1− )
(+ )3 =

ln()2(0 + 0)2
Optimal communication is then such that  = ∗ which implies that
∗ = 1
ln()[ln(

1− )− ln(
∗
1− ∗ )]
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(2) Suppose, next, that   2
3+ . Then  is convex until  reaches 23+ , and then concave.
The marginal impact of an incremental unit of eﬀort is increasing for   2
3+ and then
decreasing when   2
3+ . In particular, the optimal eﬀort is such that  ≤ 23+ . We can
see that the optimal eﬀort is either 0 or ˆ the unique  such that 0() = 0 and  ≤ 2
3+ .
Compare the payoﬀs of these two eﬀort levels:
() = (0)− (ˆ) = (())−((∗)) + 
ln()[ln(

1− )− ln(
∗
1− ∗ )]
Study how  varies with . We have:
0() = −
2(0 + 0)2
(+ )3 +

ln()(
1
 +
1
1− )
0() = 
2(0 + 0)2
(1− ) ((
∗)− ())
Note that there is a unique ¯  2
3+ such that (¯) = (∗). From the variations of function
 , we know that 0 is  0 over ]0 ∗[,  0 over ]∗ ¯[ and  0 over ]¯ 1[. Therefore, 
is increasing over [0 ∗], decreasing over [∗ ¯] and increasing over [¯ 1]. Since (∗) = 0
and (1) = +∞, there is a unique level ∗  ¯  2
3+ such that (∗) = 0 and   ∗ ⇒
(0)  (ˆ) and   ∗ ⇒ (0)  (ˆ). QED.
Comparative statics.
From the characterization of ∗, we can write:
∗ = −1( 
ln()2(0 + 0)2 )
where −1 is the inverse of  over the range [0 2
3+ ]. Since  is increasing in that range,
−1 is also increasing. Since  only depends on  and , this shows that ∗ is increasing in
 and decreasing in , 0 and 0.
To study the comparative statics of ∗, introduce () = (()) + 
ln() ln(

1−) such
that () = () − (∗). Note that  has the same variations as . Consider 1  2.
Then
( 2)− ( 1) = 2 − 1
ln() ln(

1− )
and this function is increasing in . Since ∗ is increasing in , we have: ∗2  ∗1. Moreover,
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∗2  23+ hence lies in the range where ( 1) is decreasing. Since ∗2  ∗2, (∗2 2) −
(∗2 1)  (∗2 2)−(∗2 ). This means that (∗2 2)−(∗2 2)  (∗2 1)−(∗2 2).
Since (∗2 2)− (∗2 2) = (∗2 2) = 0 and (∗1 1)  (∗2 1), we have
(∗2 1)− (∗1 1) = (∗2 1)  0
and hence ∗2  ∗1. Finally, note that an increase in  has the same impact as a decrease
in . QED.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Since () maximizes  ( ), we have:  ( ()) ≥  ( (())) for any . There-
fore, [ ( ())|] −  ≥ [ ( (()))|] −  for any . This means that the
maximum of the first function is greater than or equal to the maximum of the second
function and  ∗ ≥ ∗. Next, note that for any ,  ∗ ≥ [ ( (()))|]−
and this implies that  ∗ ≥ ∗. QED.
Proof of statements in Section 4.2.
If  is linear,  = 0 and () = 0 − 0  and  ( ()) = 1220 − 00+ 12 
2
0 2. This
means that [ ( ())|] = 1
2
20−00+ 12 
2
0 2. Since  = 0 and 2 = 20+ ,
we have: [ ( ())|] = (0 (0)) + 12 
2
0  .
When is ( ()) approximately linear? We have:  ( ()) = 1
2
(0−0)2
+ =
1
2
20 (1−
00 )2
1+ 
.
If 0 ¿ 0, then (1−  00 )2 ≈ 1− 2 00 . If ¿ , then 11+  ≈ 1− 

 . If both conditions
are satisfied, then  ( ()) ≈ 1
2
20(1−  20+00 ). QED.
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